US-NK summit unlikely in 2023: Korea Society

Opening up new defense cost-sharing talks isn’t necessary

This is the second in a series of interviews with security experts at leading think tanks in Washington and former U.S. officials on the implications of the escalating arms race in Northeast Asia and South Korea’s growing nuclear ambitions. — ED.

Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine has had various impacts on the Korean Peninsula, with expanded takeaways for the alliance between Washington and Seoul.

The war in Europe has validated the significance of focusing on greater military readiness before actual threats are materialized rather than after. It has also reminded many South Koreans of the strategic importance of the Washington-Seoul alliance.

While chances are very low that South Korea could find itself in a similar situation to what’s happening in Ukraine now, the country’s conservative ruling party doesn’t underestimate the increased public support for Seoul to develop its own nuclear arsenal to deter Pyongyang.

The Yoon Suk Yeol administration is sending messages to the right-wing support bases that the government is positioned to manage such concerns through strengthening extended deterrence with the United States. Rather than going nuclear, this includes more positioning of strategic U.S. assets, such as striker groups close to the peninsula, the redeployment tactical nuclear weapons and introducing a nuclear-sharing plan as well.

Despite growing calls for South Korea to acquire its own nuclear weapons amid North Korea’s growing nuclear threats, Yoon confirmed Seoul’s commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), under which it is banned from developing its own nuclear weapons. But amid the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear programs and lingering questions regarding the reliability of Washington’s extended deterrence, politicians here are pursuing nuclear-sharing arrangements with the country’s biggest ally.

The Korea Society President and CEO Thomas J. Byrne told The Korea Times that he doesn’t think that nuclear sharing, similar to the U.S. arrangement with NATO, is on the table for South Korea, as NATO-style nuclear sharing doesn’t necessarily mean the co-hosting of nuclear weapons.

“But the allies have communicated that they will conduct tabletop drills that explore what North Korea’s nuclear threat could mean in practical terms

and how the allies can best respond. It’s important to remember that nuclear sharing in the NATO context is not the actual co-hosting of nuclear weapons, but rather sharing the mission and responsibilities,”

Byrne said. The Korea Society is a New Yorkbased nonpartisan think tank.

During his recent visit here, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said he prefers the idea of extended deterrence, which means U.S. nuclear deterrence covers NATO member nations as well as partners that don’t possess their own nuclear weapons. He didn’t elaborate.

Within the same context, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin vowed more positioning of Washington’s strategic military assets such as F-22 and F-35 stealth jets and other airstrike groups during his meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup in Seoul.

Lloyd went on to say that this posture is a part of the U.S.’ commitment to improved nuclear deterrence to counter North Korea’s nuclear threats, in recognition that more South Koreans remain positive about the country possessing its own nuclear weapons.

Foreign Minister Park Jin is set to meet U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Washington, Feb. 4 (KST), before Blinken’s planned visit to China. Ways on how to deter North Korean nuclear threats through the trilateral alliance between Seoul, Washington and Tokyo will be included at the meeting, according to security and intelligence officials in Seoul.

Regarding an escalation of North Korea’s military provocations and South Korean officials’ repeated warnings since early last year that the North has completed the preparations necessary for its seventh nuclear test, the top executive only responded, “The best diplomatic and strategic outcome would be denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and nuclear weapon non-proliferation regionally and globally.”

Biden unlikely to meet North Korea’s Kim in 2023

Because North Korea is situated with favorable conditions for its weapons advancements amid the U.S.’ focus on the war in Ukraine, Russia and technology crackdown efforts against China, it’s unlikely that the North will return to diplomacy anytime soon, said U.S. officials.

This means that there are high chances for Pyongyang to use today’s economic difficulties brought on by the

COVID-19 pandemic and efforts to level up its capability advancements to boost loyalty and morale among citizens in Pyongyang, considered as Kim Jongun’s key political base.

Following this assessment, Byrne said given the current geopolitical conditions, it’s not a desirable scenario for the U.S. to pursue a summit this year between President Joe Biden and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

“Although conditions are tense at the moment, we should remember how 2018’s PyeongChang Olympics were preceded by 2017’s North Korea’s provocative intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) launches and President Trump’s fire-and-fury threat. However, the preeminence of nuclear weapons over economic development policies in North Korea, the prevailing regional and geopolitical conditions do not seem conducive for 2023 as a summit year like in 2018,” Byrne responded.

Regarding the feasibility of initiating arms control discussions as a measure to entice North Korea back to negotiations, Byrne said a return to talks would be a welcome development, but stressed the ball is in Pyongyang’s court.

“The Biden administration has stated it is ready to do so at any time without preconditions. Given the stated policies of Seoul and Washington alike, it only seems possible that arms control talks can be conducted if North Korea’s denuclearization is specified as the end goal,” he said.

A focus on disarmament in the North is still at the core of Washington’s policy. While some U.S. officials and experts have suggested prioritizing reducing risks and achieving “small gains” while remaining committed to disarmament, official U.S. policy continues to resist adjustment.

He said there’s no need for South Korea to renew its defense cost-sharing agreement with the U.S. as the deal is effective through 2025. The Special Measures Agreement (SMA) asks Seoul to adjust its share of the defense cost burden based on increases in defense spending between 2022 and 2025. These costs are expected to rise by 6.1 percent, annually.

“The SMA reached between Seoul and Washington in 2021 for the sharing of expenditures incident to the maintenance of the U.S. Armed Forces in South Korea resolved a contentious, long renegotiation process and is effective through 2025,” Byrne said. “The provisions of this agreement seem the best way to keep the goal of a strong and mutual commitment to the Republic of Korea-United States of America alliance, rather than open up a new negotiation with new provisions.”

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It’s important to remember that nuclear sharing in the NATO context is not the actual co-hosting of nuclear weapons, but rather sharing the mission and responsibilities.

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