Roadmap for Korea-US technology cooperation

The last decade has made it clear that China did not move toward open trade, freer markets, or political liberalization as so many expected. Instead, under President Xi Jinping, China doubled down on authoritarian politics and mercantilist economic and trade policies. This would be problematic enough on its own, but China appears to be also seeking global economic and political hegemony — so it can be challenged by no one.

As such, the challenge from China is not simply to Korea’s advanced technology sectors, such as semiconductors, autos and batteries, but to Korea’s autonomy, with China potentially calling the shots, not only in Southeast Asia but across the globe.

While the United States has taken since World War II to protect the global economy and global freedom, it can no longer do this on its own. China is just too big and now too advanced technologically.

As such, it is time for much closer technology cooperation between the United States and our allied partners, particularly Korea. While Korean and U.S. firms will continue to compete — fairly and by the rules, unlike Chinese firms — Korea and America also need to focus on “coopetition”: both competing and cooperating.

There are a number of ways the new administration can help Korea cooperate with the United States on innovation. One way is to engage with the Biden administration on its new Indo-Pacific Economic Partnership (IPEP) initiative. While this is still a work in progress, the goal is to build partnerships with key nations in the Indo-Pacific region to address a host of issues to increase collective capabilities and strengths.

There are a host of steps that could be taken. The U.S. and Korea could establish an IPEF innovation policy experts’ group to work on a set of joint innovation issues common to both nations. The new administration could work with the Biden administration to identify key technology areas critical to both nations but also areas where both nations possess strengths to boost collaboration.

These areas might include 6G networks, energy storage, next generation semiconductors and others. Cooperation might take multiple forms. For example, Korean and U.S. federal research laboratories might enter into research partnerships.

Both countries could enable federally-funded research centers at universities to work cooperatively with institutions from other nations. Industry-university research centers, like the U.S. Manufacturing USA Centers, might be made reciprocal so that companies from both nations could participate in similar centers in each nation.

Overall, both countries could connect centers of excellence and advanced manufacturing firms with their international counterparts to share best practices and build trade connections.

Both countries could work to develop common industrial classification standards so that partners can conduct cooperative economic statistics gathering and more accurately assess and map supply chains.

They could cooperate on Open Radio Access Network (or ORAN) equipment. The U.S. and Korea could align collaborative international development aid/assistance, development finance support, and export credit initiatives to encourage nations to select digital technologies, solutions, and platforms from vendors from like-minded nations.

Both nations could work more closely regarding the free flow of data across borders. One place for cooperation is on government access to data. They could agree that data flows between the two countries would be considered trusted as they involve countries that are all committed to international best practices as it relates to government access to data.

In addition, as Korea and the U.S. pursue national strategies to increase their competitiveness in artificial intelligence, including via digital trade, they could use IPEF to support the development of joint data trusts and other data-sharing models to improve the quality (and the quantity) of the data that is the key input into digital goods, services, and research.

Both nations could also work more closely together on technology standards, where China today is using the weight of the Chinese Communist Party to distort the global standards process.

This cooperation would involve setting a high-level policy forum among the two governments’ standards experts (with an appropriate balanced scope given the government’s interests and role in standards) on their respective approaches to new and emerging technologies and how best to address associated public policy issues, especially as it relates to the development and application of measurement standards.

This could also involve establishing cybersecurity, cloud services, AI and critical infrastructure security modules to exchange information and best practices, such as the Cybersecurity Framework of the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

Geotechnology is becoming increasingly important, especially as China seeks through initiatives like Made in China 2025 to dominate global technology industries. As such, there are numerous opportunities for Korea and the United States to work together to help joint innovation.