E-paper

Art of Korea-China summit

Lee Seong-hyon Lee Seong-hyon (sunnybbsfs@gmail.com), Ph.D., is the director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the Sejong Institute

In early April, the government said, “As soon as the coronavirus situation stabilizes, we have decided to push forward Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Korea at an early date.” The announcement came after a meeting of the foreign ministers of Korea and China in the Chinese coastal city of Xiamen.

Xi’s visit to Korea is a realm of diplomatic negotiations and political decisions between the two countries. So, the possibility remains open. However, from an analytic perspective, there are also some factors that may make the summit difficult to materialize. Here are some observations that render support to this rationale.

First, China tends to withhold new diplomatic initiatives with South Korea when the President of Korea enters the fourth year in office. It is because she or he enters the lame duck period. China waits for the next Korean government. China displayed this pattern during the Lee Myung-bak administration, and also that of his successor Park Geun-hye, whose term was prematurely terminated due to her impeachment.

The Korean Constitution stipulates the president to a single-fiveyear term. It is difficult to ensure continuity of diplomatic agreements under the Korean presidential system, especially long-term projects. In addition, the polarized, partisan Korean politics often abandons or repeals the previous administrations’ policies.

This is especially true of the North Korean policy that China considers sensitive. China is well aware that the North Korean issue is the most important agenda for the South Korean side. At the same time, China has also learned that the Korean government in the past pursued completely different, even contradictory, policies toward North Korea, based on its ideological tendencies, and asked for

China to be in line with the Korean government’s policy position at the time. “Last time, the South Korean government asked us to choke North Korea’s neck. This time, the South Korean government asked us not to. We don’t know which beat to match,” a Chinese interlocutor once complained.

Second, it doesn’t seem clear what both Korea and China can achieve from the summit. The summit is an occasion where the top decision makers of both countries meet in person and sign off major policy and diplomatic initiatives with each other. As mentioned, however, President Moon Jae-in has entered his final year in office. China is well aware that Moon’s power is waning.

From the Chinese side, its biggest foreign policy mandate is how to manage the current U.S.-China rivalry. Under such a strategic calculus, its ultimate concern with Seoul, a U.S. ally, is how the latter positions itself between the two global superpowers.

This has a lot of geopolitical ramifications. For instance, it involves whether South Korea will join the Quad, or whether South Korea will continue to cooperate with China and supply advanced semiconductor chips. The same is true of the human rights issues concerning China, as well as the murmured consideration by Washington to boycott the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, in case the U.S.-China rivalry further intensifies. As a U.S. ally, South Korea has to make decisions.

China seems to believe that South Korea, a democratic institution, is, eventually, likely to lean toward the U.S. side, in the overall scheme of policies. This is especially true if the next Korean government is from the conservative wing.

Third, the continuing COVID-19 situation. It was reported that China considered Xi’s visit last fall, but scrapped the plan as the number of the infection cases in Korea rebounded. The Chinese side hoped to use the summit occasion to highlight the fact that both China and Korea are Asian countries that successfully contained the pandemic, underscoring the Asian values and Asian governance. Xi reportedly said, “The East rising, the West declining” (dong sheng xi jiang).

Fourth, currently, there is an unprecedented anti-Chinese sentiment in Korea. The gradually rising Korean antipathy toward China has been, in fact, snowballing since China’s economic retaliation against South Korea for the deployment of THAAD, followed by Xi’s revisionist speech on the Korean War. When it rains it pours. Unfortunate skirmishes ensued. There were the Chinese uproar over the Korean boyband BTS’ displaying solidarity with the United States. Many Korean took great offense when some Chinese claimed the Chinese origin of kimchi and hanbok, to name a few.

All politics is local. Xi Jinping’s visit to Korea, if materialized, will be also factored into the Korean politics that is entering the presidential campaign. The government will take that into consideration.

Opinion

en-kr

2021-05-12T07:00:00.0000000Z

2021-05-12T07:00:00.0000000Z

https://ktimes.pressreader.com/article/281702617594883

The Korea Times Co.